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
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Social Values and Behaviour

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FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR ONTARIO
-- Social Values and Behaviour --

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Prepared for
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FOREWORD

As part of the Transportation Outlooks project, seven papers were commissioned, dealing with well-defined themes of major significance to the future development of Ontario. Under the main heading Future Scenarios for Ontario, the titles of the papers are as follows:

- 1/ The Environment
- 2/ Resources Sector
- 3/ Production
- 4/ Multinational Corporations
- 5/ Social Values and Behaviour
- 6/ Political Change
- 7/ Preliminary Assessment of New Technologies

The papers were commissioned from experts, several of them of national or international renown, in various fields. It is expected that their work, and additional material related to it, will be used in the development of a number of alternative scenarios of Ontario's prospects. The main objectives are to stimulate thinking about the future and to elicit feedback from MTC planners and other users of such information in order to guide further studies of the future, that are both relevant and timely.

It should be noted that these papers, which were completed in June 1982, are primarily the speculations or opinions of experts, not statements of fact. It should also be clear that a different choice of experts would have produced another set of opinions. Part of the process of anticipating future change is the painstaking analysis of detail, including quantitative information, and the expert assessment of emerging and disappearing trends and other qualitative information. Another part is the careful integration and synthesis of all these different types of information. Futures research requires the involvement and participation of all users to improve on the application of futures information to current decision-making.

Most of the reports delineate events as they would develop if Ontario, Canada, and the world were to follow two broadly different futures: low growth and high growth, as described in the following.

Low Growth

This future assumes an economic environment characterized by continued slow economic growth and attempts to reinforce the existing industrial structures globally and locally. The gap between North and South continues to widen, and there is little change in conditions in the Third World. Also, relations between East and West continue to be strained. At the same time, attempts to liberalize trade and capital movements as well as reform the international monetary system will be piecemeal and sporadic.

High Growth

The main features of this environment are more rapid economic growth and attempts to harness the new technologies (e.g., micro-electronics, biotechnology, oceanography, etc.) in building a new industrial structure globally and locally. The assumptions include greater co-operation between East and West, and North and South, with rapid improvements in the conditions of the Third World. At the same time, there will be strong and relatively successful attempts to liberalize trade and capital movements as well as reform the international monetary system.

Two of the reports are based on different pre-conditions. In the case of Preliminary Assessment of New Technologies, the two scenarios were simply omitted, and an assessment was done of the potential of developing a high-technology future for Ontario. The paper Political Change deals with two main scenarios and a third scenario which considers an overlay on each of the preceding two. One pre-condition -- in effect, an amalgamation of two alternatives -- was given for this paper and is as follows.

Assume a competitive world environment (politically and economically) with slow rates of economic growth for most nations, a high priority for more economically successful countries to re-industrialize using high technology, and serious international competition for resources and markets. There will be winners and losers nationally, as well as by and within industrial sectors.

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the current mood of the population of Ontario and the manner in which people are relating to their environment. Dominant cultural traits and differences between segments of the population are analysed in regard to social values and behaviour and their relationship to each other.

This current situation is applied for forecasting purposes, under scenarios of low and high growth. The likelihood of changes in behaviour and values is postulated, considering the conflicts between the two and the resolution of these conflicts. Types of change are considered.

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1/ INTRODUCTION

1.1/ Theoretical Assumptions

Professor M. Rokeach defines a value as:

"... an enduring belief that a specified mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. [And] a value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance." [1].

In studying social values then, Rokeach and other social scientists have made a major assumption as to their centrality and structuring effect in motivating social behaviour. For this assumption, a value is seen as central in defining right and wrong and "the world as the individual sees it." Value systems, in turn, structure the way in which the individual evaluates the world and its activities on a continuing basis.

An analysis of social values at any given point in time, therefore, is deemed important, because knowledge of a society's values should provide insights into the way and manner that culture will resolve conflicts, choose between alternatives and make decisions. At the same time, values are seen to guide activities and behaviour. In short, it is assumed that "people normally act in ways that are congruent with their values" [2].

This classical approach to the study of social values assumes a more or less linear relationship between values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour [3]. Values define right and wrong and provide a perspective to view the world. This world-view provides cues to evaluate activities, organizations and events in that world (i.e., beliefs). These beliefs, in turn, lead to positive and negative assessments of those activities, organizations and events (i.e., attitudes). Behaviour then is seen to be the natural end-product in this chain of (tacit or understood) rationality.

As helpful as this theory has been in explaining, evaluating and projecting social behaviour, enough evidence now exists to suggest that the linearity of the relationship between values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour is not quite as pristine as the classic theorists would like to believe.

In his pioneering study "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," Nowak, by analysing 25 years of quasi-longitudinal research, concludes that the massive upheaval and change in social behaviour experienced in Poland in recent years did not stem from a change in social values, but from a demand for social institutions more in accord with enduring values held over that total period of time [4]. Equally, in North America, examples can be found where social values have changed over time as a consequence of public policy that has legislated changed social behaviour (e.g., the changed North American values concerning equality and equal access to schooling, emanating almost 30 years after the Supreme Court decision, Brown vs. the School Board (1954)).

Having introduced and made these points, however, the primary purpose of this paper is not to add to this debate. Rather, the purpose is to analyse empirical data relating to social values and behaviour in Ontario over the last two years, and once this is done, to postulate on the existing and continuing relationship between values and behaviour.* In this way, by recognizing the conflicting theoretical assumptions concerning values and behaviour, but by ignoring them in the analysis of Ontario's case, it may be possible to present an uncoloured picture of their current relationship, which can be applied for forecasting purposes in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper.

* All observations concerning social values and behaviour in Ontario, and relating to the first part of this paper, are based on survey research findings. The difficulty of presenting supporting tables for each statement, of course, is obvious. Also, while the observations are based on empirical findings, the integration and synthesis of these findings is much more normative and based solely on the author's analysis.

2/ CURRENT SITUATION

2.1/ Dominant Cultural Traits

Perhaps the best way to begin a review of social values and behaviour of Ontario inhabitants is to analyse their current mood and the way they relate to their environment. (See Figure 1.)

In systemic terms, Ontarians recognize there are problems to be faced. (See the Global Satisfaction Index, which measures the level of satisfaction expressed in how "the Canadian system" is operating [Figure 1].) They disproportionately describe the economy as poor or only fair, are dissatisfied with the direction in which the country is headed, and are able to articulate the source of their concerns. At the same time, whether it is tacitly or explicitly understood, there is recognition that the operation of the system impacts on the individual. (See the Personal Satisfaction Index, which measures the level of satisfaction with the individual's personal state (Figure 1).) It is evident that, as the operation of the system is seen to deteriorate, the individual acknowledges that his personal prospects also decline. Notwithstanding this understanding, the tendency of the average Ontarian is to say that he or she is much better off than "the system." In short, readily-recognized problems at the systemic level are believed to impact on the individual, but their effects tend to be viewed as much more profound on "others," than themselves.

In terms of their future outlook (General Outlook Index), Ontarians tend to be significantly more optimistic than pessimistic (Figure 1). Again, there is a relationship between global satisfaction, personal satisfaction and general outlook: as the system deteriorates, personal prospects deteriorate, as do future prospects, and vice-versa. But again, as interesting as the relationship between these three measures of mood is, perhaps the more interesting and pertinent phenomenon is the continued disparity or "gap" between the three indicators.

Ontarians recognize that they are facing problems and that these problems impact on them and their future prospects. But at the same time, their tendency is to say that their personal circumstances are much better than




Figure 1/ Mood of the Province

than the system's, and in fact, that the future should be significantly better than both. When Ontarians view their world then, their primary tendency is to see a gap between "the world as it is" (Global Satisfaction) and "the world as it should be" (General Outlook). On a personal level, they also see a gap, although smaller, between "aspirations attained" (Personal Satisfaction) and "aspirations sought" (General Outlook).

What is found in analysis of the mood of the province is a condition where Ontarians view their and the system's current condition as an aberration. In systemic terms, Ontarians recognize that the country and province have problems, and are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. Yet they continue to believe that "Canada is the best country in which to live," and that "Canada has the resources and potential to solve its own economic problems." On a personal level, they recognize that they are worse off now than they were four or five years ago, yet still claim they are overwhelmingly optimistic about their future personal prospects.

The gap (evident in the general mood) between "the world as it is" and "the world as it should be," on the one hand, and "aspirations attained" and "aspirations sought," on the other, is also evident in the value structures and behaviour of the Ontario population.

As individuals, Ontarians would have to be characterized as inefficacious. They believe that "the individual can't really do much to change the course of events" and that "today's problems are so complicated that a person really can't understand what's going on." This lack of personal efficacy would normally lead one to conclude that Ontario should be characterized by a complacent and resigned population. Yet the data also show that Ontarians overwhelmingly believe their problems are solvable, and look to governments and institutions for those solutions. In short, what is seen in the value systems of Ontarians is low personal efficacy and high systemic efficacy.

On the personal level, the same incongruity between social values and behaviour is witnessed.

Ontarians continue to believe and cling to value systems more reminiscent of the '50s than any "pop culture" of the '80s. They believe that "in Canada, with hard work, they can be anything they want to be," that their children have "the right to expect more than when they were growing up," and that "education is the key to success in the future." At the same time, however, they also believe they have worked hard but are not "anything they want to be"; they despair more for their children's future than their own; and claim that the education system is a major source of unemployment problems. Against this traditional value system, a plethora of changed or "new" behaviours (i.e., extra-marital cohabitation, the "back to the earth" phenomenon, and physical fitness) that would suggest a massive alteration (where, in fact, none exists) of value systems is witnessed, in recent years.

What is seen, again and again, is an apparent contradiction in value systems, and discontinuity between beliefs and behaviour. Perhaps nowhere is this contradiction more profound than in the overarching priorities of Canada. If the desires of Canadians could be encapsulated in two words, they would be progress and stability. In turn, stability is associated with control, and progress is measured through consumption. And nowhere in Canada is this desire more pronounced than in Ontario.

While on the surface "progress and stability" would not seem to be immediately associated with either a contradiction or discontinuity, the reader must understand that, as desires, they are mutually inclusive: in fact, stability is seen to be a pre-condition of progress.

The progress ethic and a sense of national or systemic efficacy dominate Ontario's value system. Stability is also valued, but normally not as an end unto itself. Because Ontarians view the province's and their current condition (again, "the world as it is" and "aspirations attained") as undesirable, however, stability becomes the necessary prerequisite for progress.

Ontarians see neither themselves nor the province progressing. Conflict, in turn, threatens to widen "the gap" between "the world as it is" and "the world as it should be," and between "aspirations attained" and "aspirations sought." Progress, therefore, is threatened by conflict.

Also, because the province as well as the individual is not seen to be progressing, the current condition is viewed as unstable and conflict-prone. Ontarians, therefore, demand change, but not change as normally understood: to chart new and bold courses, etc. Change is desired in order to produce stability. Ontarians, therefore, desire the maximum amount of change with the minimum amount of dislocation.

This discontinuity between values and beliefs, and beliefs and behaviour produces two tendencies which, if not unique to Canada and Ontario, are certainly important to understanding the current and future state of social values and behaviour in the province and country. The first is termed "the desire for control," and the second, "status substitution."

A desire for control is directed to the way in which the individual relates to the system. Because the system is efficacious and able to solve readily-perceived problems, the tendency of the Ontario population is to look to the system, and the major actors therein, for control and stability in their lives and the state of the country's affairs.

Status substitution relates not so much to the way in which the individual relates to the system, but rather the way in which the individual resolves the conflict between "aspirations sought" and "aspirations obtained." Because the individual is inefficacious, he or she cannot close the gap between "the world as it is" and "the world as it should be." But because this individual is also not prepared to abandon his traditional value system and is not fulfilling those values through traditional behavioural routes, he will seek alternate aspiration fulfillment through non-traditional forms of status and behaviour. In other words, he will seek substitute status.

These two tendencies, a desire for control and status substitution, can be identified as the two dominant cultural traits running through Ontario social values and behaviour.

2.1.1/ The Desire for Control

The desire for control manifests itself in many different values and behaviours (see Figure 2). Among these are the following.




Figure 2/ Current Trends in Ontario's Values and Behaviours

- **A Pragmatic Appreciation of Government Intervention**

Ontarians have been and are more than prepared to embrace and accept government intervention into the private sector and their lives. This interventionist tendency on the part of the population, often mistakenly viewed as an outgrowth of ideology, is really nothing more than a function of this desire for control. In fact, the only ideology that appears to be operative in the case of Ontario is ideology of "that which works." That is, Ontarians make their assessment of government intervention, not on the basis of a right/left analysis, but on an analysis of "does it work?" Petro-Canada is supported because it is seen to be an understandable answer to an incomprehensible question -- in the face of uncertainty about the energy future and the motives of a foreign-owned industry, a Canadian company dedicated to security of supply is seen "to work." The Post Office, on the other hand, is opposed because it is seen as an incomprehensible answer to an understandable question -- it doesn't work. While the criterion for this appreciation of government intervention is deemed pragmatism, the ultimate litmus, once again, is how much that intervention answers the desire for control.

- **Non-Government Institutions as Agencies of Control and Stability**

Like government intervention, Ontarians rate other institutions on the basis of how much those institutions and their services meet the needs, wants and aspirations of citizens (as opposed to consumers of that service). In total, there is a public that ascribes relatively low levels of confidence in private-sector institutions, not due to any anti-business bias, but because the services and operations are seen as essentially private and not pertinent to these needs and aspirations. Widows and farmers relate to the insurance industry, while others do not, for this very reason. Equally, Ontarians, and even union members, have very little confidence in unions because they are associated with the withdrawal of services and instability. Again, the desire for control is dictating public and private-sector attitudes, as well as behaviour towards specific institutions and their activities.

- **Meanness and Fairness in Social Policy and Civil Liberties**

The desire for control produces a rather odd set of beliefs and behaviours vis-a-vis social policies and civil liberties. On one hand,

Ontarians are more than prepared to embrace and mouth all the finer sensibilities of individualism and egalitarianism. On the other hand, if actual examples of individualism and egalitarianism are seen to threaten stability, Ontarians are more than prepared to exhibit collectivism and authoritarianism in their attitudes and behaviour. Acceptance of The War Measures Act and the massive upturn in popular support for Mr Trudeau and the Liberal government following its implementation are but two specific examples of this tendency. The same tendency tends to prevail on issues of social policy. For example, Ontarians believe eligibility requirements for unemployment insurance should be tightened up considerably, but also feel those found eligible should receive significantly higher payments. In summary, the population reacts to social policy and civil liberties from a posture of collectivism and particularism, rather than the individualism and egalitarianism normally associated with North American culture.

● Desire for Change and Fear of Change

As mentioned earlier, Ontarians value change to the extent that it produces stability. Change unto itself, therefore, is not valued. In fact, change which is seen as threatening stability is resisted. One current example is the population's attitude towards technological advancement. At present, Ontarians ascribe no tangible benefits to the introduction of technology into the workplace. They do, however, overwhelmingly associate the introduction of technology with a need for manpower training. At the same time, the working population is more than prepared to admit that there are benefits to skill upgrading. Ontarians, therefore, resist technological change because they associate it with the need for skill enhancement which they currently do not have -- in short, it is a change which threatens stability, because of the population's inability to cope with it.

● Ontario as Canada

Ontarians and historians relate to this province as "the heartland." Notions of "limited" or "regional identity," where the population's primary allegiance is to their province, do not hold up in Ontario. Ontarians relate to and equate the province with Canada (in fact, this

propensity has even been noted in the attitudes of Ontario children to regimes and authority in Canada). This tendency, in turn, is more than chauvinism or regionocentrism. For Ontarians, the province represents progress and stability. As such, the province, like other things representing progress and stability, is valued, not unto itself or in isolation, but as part of Canada, and for the role it plays in Confederation. For this reason, the tendency of Ontarians when faced with national conflict is to seek compromise and consensus in their political leadership and policy options. At the same time, this sometimes translates into support for the status quo, in other words, the continued support of Ontario's heartland status. From this perspective, Ontario's leadership in Canada and Confederation is also deemed to be a prerequisite for national stability and control.

2.1.2/ Status Substitution

These major themes relating to the desire for control all produce demands on the system to close "the gap" between the "world as it is" and the "world as it should be" -- demands for solutions, public policy, protection and sometimes to do nothing. Unlike these demand-derived tendencies, status substitution presents an internalized means of rationalizing or coping with "the gap" between "aspirations attained" and "aspirations sought." Included among the values and behaviours produced through status substitution are the following.

● Work-Style Trade-offs

A Calvinist work ethic would suggest that work unto itself is noble, and that monetary gain is simply the most tangible demonstration of the worth of your nobility. Part of that ethic continues to exist in Ontario. Workers tend to be proud of the company they work for and would rather work than not. Traditionally, the status derived and sought from this value commitment was monetary. What is now seen is a labour force, faced with a continued inability to realize status aspirations through salary, that is prepared to seek non-traditional status in the workplace. Workers over the age of 60 report that they are prepared to trade off salary for increased pension coverage. The youngest workers value vacations over salary. And the workforce in aggregate claims to be prepared to trade off salary for either greater access to manpower training or a safer and more enjoyable work environment.

● Consumer Trade-Offs

Reports abound of falling car sales, the proliferation of fast-food outlets, the move away from single family living towards a condominium-ized nation, and so on. All suggest a massive realignment of consumer values. Once again, however, there are very few direct value changes in empirical data to support this notion. In addition, a closer examination of these behavioural changes and their attitudinal antecedents reveals not so much a realignment in social behaviour, but, rather, a readjustment. Automobile sales are not down dramatically -- North American automobile sales are. In fact, luxury car sales are up significantly, as is the reported number of automobiles in the average Ontarian home. Similarly, the commitment to home ownership as a right is as high as ever, and the average Ontarian continues to report he/she would rather eat at home than dine out. These changed consumer patterns again are explainable in the context of status substitution. The young up-scale consumer who buys a Datsun Maxima, an Yves St. Laurent suit and a \$2000 stereo, instead of saving prudently for a home has not abandoned his commitment to home ownership. He has simply satisfied his status need for tangible possessions in different ways, now that housing prices and interest rates have sky-rocketed -- new ways of satisfying old values when old ways prove impossible.

● Lifestyle Trade-offs

Cohabitation, physical fitness, leisure activities, health food and other behaviours are all pointed to as indicators of "the new values." The absence of any altered value systems corresponding to these behavioural changes would suggest that the only things new are the lifestyles themselves. In fact, the atomistic notion that these new lifestyles represent new "do your own thing" individualism is simply unfounded in empirical research; it is contradicted. What is happening is a better-educated and more-discriminating public, in an information culture, is seeking new ways to express an identity and, at the same time, be accepted (i.e., to conform) in that better-educated, discriminating, information culture.

● Priority Trade-Offs

All of the above suggests the periodic alteration of priorities, even if they are not value driven. The substitution of status or priorities to conform to the new reality is also operative when it comes to issue concerns. As anxiety about the economic primacy of the province increases, an increased priority is being placed on the quality of life enjoyed in the province. The concerns of Ontarians are still economic, and the value is still economic primacy, but as the epicentre of economic power is seen to move West, the desire for an improved quality of life increases. It is almost as if Ontarians think "they should be the most prosperous, but if, for whatever reason, they don't have the highest standard of living, at least they have the best quality of life." As preposterous as this might seem, what is observed, again and again, is a public, motivated almost exclusively by economic concerns, being mobilized by issues such as hospital closings, acid rain and educational standards.

2.2/ Sub-Group Variance in Dominant and Major Themes

Any review as general and sweeping as this, of course, is incomplete without a discussion of variance and differences in social values and behaviours among the various sub-groups or segments making up the population.

As true as this maxim is, in the case at hand, the most profound and significant finding in this sub-group analysis is the absence, rather than the presence, of differences among the populations. While differences exist, they tend to be of degree, not direction. No demographic or geographic segment of the Ontario population is satisfied with the way the system is operating; none say they personally are worse off than the system; none claim the future will be worse than their current circumstances; and so on. From this perspective then, Ontario can be characterized as having one dominant value system, rather than a multitude of conflicting ones.

Notwithstanding this continuity of value systems across segments of the Ontario population, some differences of degree do exist and are important to the understanding of Ontario today and in the future. These include the following.

● Age Differences

While there is very little difference in the value structures of Ontarians, based on age, behaviour is quite different. The so-called "Big Generation" grew up with the value systems of the Depression and War Generation -- hard work, progress, achievement and materialism. By and large, these values remain intact today. The difference is that this generation was inculcated with behavioural patterns quite different from their parents. For the younger generation, therefore, there is far more acceptance of non-traditional behaviours as means to achieve status aspirations. This generation has also been faced with a reality and problems quite different than those experienced in the '30s, '40s and '50s. If anything, these individuals tend to be most affected by status substitution. They are more prone to accept non-salary trade-offs in the workplace, satisfy themselves with new consumer status, and participate in the new lifestyles.

The older generation, on the other hand, is most cross-pressured and unable to cope with the differences between the old values and the new realities. As a consequence, they find it more difficult to seek substitute status, and demonstrate the strongest desire for control.

Finally, the oldest generation is the least happy, most pessimistic and the most resigned to the new reality.

● Urban/Rural

Much of the discussion above applies principally to the urban population. The rural population has far fewer avenues open to them to seek substitute status. As a result, much of the obvious behavioural change witnessed in the cities is not as prevalent in Ontario's smaller communities. This is not to say that the discord which produces status substitution is absent in the rural areas, but, rather, that the means of relieving this discord are fewer. (The historic, rural way of coping with the gap between "aspirations sought" and "aspirations achieved" was

to move to the city.) Similarly, the desire for control is not quite as strong in the rural centres, and the focus for that control appears to be far narrower.

- **Sex**

While it may seem like a bad joke, the traditional assumption is that sex is not a particularly good indicator of value or behavioural differences. In fact, historic voter research went as far as to suggest that wives voted in accordance with their husband's wishes.

Sex is still not a particularly powerful variable to explain differences in the population's value systems or behaviour. The difference now witnessed, however, is that women are behaving less and less like a monolith, with more and more differences being attributable to lifestyle and occupational status. That is, differences that are discernible tend to be more profound among homemakers versus working women versus professional women, than any differences between men and women, in aggregate. To be totally frank, however, the amount of research on this subject is spotty, at best. Much more probing and classification is required before definitive conclusions can be drawn.

- **Socio-Economic Status (SES)**

Again, perhaps surprisingly, income and occupational status do not form the basis for startling differences in value structures among the population. Higher income earners tend to be somewhat more satisfied with their current prospects and more optimistic about the future. They are, however, no less negative about the current operation of the system. As a consequence, the largest gap between "the world as it should be" and "the world as it is" is found among the higher SES citizens. This condition leads to a tendency for individuals with higher socio-economic status to be most supportive of institutions providing solutions (e.g., Petro-Canada) and, also, most discriminating in their choice of solutions. This tendency has also been uncovered in political research, where, contrary to all traditional theories, higher SES voters are now most prone to switch their partisan allegiance over time, and to refuse to vote under certain conditions.

● Ethnicity

Differences as easily discernible as the physical are bound to elicit notions of deeper differences. The increasingly ethnic nature of Ontario, along with the altered composition of that ethnicity in recent years, makes one assume that Ontario must similarly be changing. An analysis of the wants, needs and aspirations of Ontario's various ethno-cultural groups, however, shows very few differences between new Canadians and the host culture. Progress and stability are intensely valued. The principal difference is that Ontario's ethnic communities accept an extended time frame for the fulfillment of their aspirations. Like the host culture, however, stability is seen as a prerequisite for the fulfillment of their aspirations, and conflict, a barrier. In fact, there is quite an acute awareness that being viewed as "ethnics" by the host culture may actually produce a conflict that will further extend the time frame associated with aspiration fulfillment. For this reason, Ontario's ethnic communities are least likely to support government initiatives that would confer "special treatment" upon them. What is observed, in total, is a tension shared by members of ethno-cultural groups and the host culture which values the multi-cultural nature of the society but fears further immigration.

2.3/ Conclusions

From the above, what Ontario appears to be experiencing is a change in social behaviour, and even priorities, without a corresponding shift in values. An aggregate observation of Ontario culture, therefore, would record a conflict in value systems and an inconsistency between beliefs and behaviours. But if a value is defined as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally preferable to an opposite mode of conduct or end-state," then surely an alteration in behaviour (i.e., a preferred mode of conduct or end-state) must be, ergo, a change in values.

The difficulty in applying the classic definition of "values" to the current Ontario and Canadian context is that the definition is static -- it does not assume a conflict or choice in values, or behaviours. What is seen, on the other hand, is a population whose old values are in conflict with their current reality. The tendency of Ontarians, under

these conditions, is to equate old values with a "valued reality," and the new reality with an aberrant condition.

It is, for example, quite possible for an individual to value both financial success and self-respect. Current conditions (i.e., the new reality), however, may put these values in conflict -- the attainment of one may not correspond to the attainment of the other. Normally, it is this relativity and competitiveness of values that facilitates and engenders changes in values.

Rather than changing their values, however, the public attempts to minimize the conflict between the attainment of these competing values by not choosing between one or the other, but, rather, by altering their behaviour or seeking control in order to maintain both values and still remain value consistent.

From this perspective, the value structures and behaviours of the Ontario public could be seen to be on a precipice, for even if the traditional theory concerning values and behaviour is somewhat wanting in this real-world application, there is an overriding tendency (noted in the literature and research) for individuals to minimize the discomfort of value and behaviour inconsistency, and that tendency unto itself will motivate belief or value change towards consistency. This is what is observed now in the phenomena of status substitution and control desirability. The real question, therefore, becomes how long can, and will, the population minimize its discomfort by substitution (either behaviourally or systemically) before there is an overriding need to rationalize the value-reality ("the world as it should be" and "aspirations sought") and the new reality ("the world as it is" and "aspirations achieved"). This question, then, forms the focus of the next two parts of this discussion paper.

3/ FUTURE TRENDS

"Most people -- including many futurists -- conceive of tomorrow as a mere extension of today, forgetting that trends, no matter how seemingly powerful, do not merely continue in a linear fashion. They reach "tipping points" at which they explode into new phenomena. They reverse direction. They stop and start. Because something is happening now, or has been happening for 300 years, is not a guarantee that it will continue" [5].

Toffler and other futurists caution against projection into the future, based on past assumptions. For Toffler, change comes in waves, one trend moving the next until a crescendo of change is achieved, thereby rendering the past unrecognizable [5]. As instructive as this analogy has been in explaining historical changes and projecting future ones, it also puts forward a rather uni-dimensional view of the future -- it assumes that a change in one of society's structural spheres (e.g., the introduction of new technologies in the techno-structure) will produce change in another (e.g., value shifts in the socio-structure), and so on.

In contrast to this set of assumptions, it is quite plausible to suggest that a change in one structural sphere could produce no change in another and conversely, no change in one structural sphere could equally produce change in another. More simply put, it is quite possible that no techno-structural change could produce more conflict (i.e., the current situation in Ontario) and, therefore, eventually lead to a shift in values, while a dramatic change in the techno-structure that fed traditional values could lead to no real change in the socio-structure. A more "dynamic" view of future change, therefore, would suggest that a tension or conflict in one structural sphere might be resolved through a change in another, or might be heightened, exacerbated or altered by no change.

In fact, if the view of the future begins from the current perspective (with an Ontario public seeking value consistency by holding competing values, and altering behaviour), then the most plausible scenario is to suggest that a change in the techno-structure, that would allow for value consistency by minimizing the discomfort of value conflict, will produce

very little change in social beliefs and values ("change that produces no change"). On the other hand, the absence of any such change, which could thereby lead to the continuation of competing values, would, quite conceivably, lead to the institutionalization of the kind of altered behaviours now witnessed. This lack of structural change, in turn, would lead to a concomitant alteration of value systems, consistent with this routinized behaviour ("no change that produces change").

4/ LOW-GROWTH SCENARIO

Under a low-growth scenario, Ontario's techno-structure would be characterized by continued slow economic growth and traditional re-industrialization. Because Ontarians tend to see the current condition, typified by the absence of progress and stability (the "new reality"), as an aberration, it can be assumed that the continuation of this condition will lead to intensified cross-pressures and inconsistencies between value systems, and beliefs and behaviour. However, due to the earlier-noted psychological need to minimize the discomfort between value and behaviour inconsistency, it can also be assumed that this growing discomfort will serve as a motivator to bring these conflicting values and behaviour in closer accord.

Under this scenario then, it could be hypothesized that Ontarians will begin to accept this new reality, not as an aberration, but as a continuing condition of life. Once this acceptance is reached, it could be further hypothesized that behaviour will soon start flowing logically from a growing congruency between that which is valued and desired, and that which is perceived: the traditionally-assumed and observed linearity between values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour will once again be reflected in social values and behaviour. Ontarians will accept the lack of progress (as traditionally defined) and the presence of instability as reality; the traditional value placed on these "end-states" will diminish; new values will take their place; and behaviour consistent with these new values will be the end-result. (This is a situation, then, of no change [e.g., continued low growth] producing conflict and, therefore, change in values.)

Because it would be unrealistic to expect a wholesale break with past tendencies, however, the year 2000 would also be marked by a 1980s hang-over. Although individuals might accept their current condition as a reality and readjust their values accordingly, it could be expected that they would still place a priority on (at least maintaining) their already-lowered status. Therefore, while values and behaviour would be in much closer accord under this scenario, a tension would continue to exist. Ontarians would lower their expectations, but they would also resist any further lowering of their status. They would recognize that resources are

scarce and limited and, therefore, call for their authoritative allocation through existing power channels.

These hypotheses, taken to their logical conclusion, therefore, would lead to an Ontario culture, by the year 2000, that would be characterized by the breakdown of status substitution and the institutionalization of the desire for control. (See Figure 3.)

4.1/ The Breakdown of Status Substitution

When low growth and lack of stability are accepted as reality in Ontario, it is likely that the gap between individual's "aspirations sought" and "aspirations attained" will narrow. Individual Ontarians will then accept their current social condition ("aspirations attained") as the norm and, therefore, will not seek substitute measures of status, that they could equate to "progress." Status, therefore, would not be reflected through substitute behaviour that served as "proxies" for traditional values, but rather on direct behaviour consistent with these new values.

Some of the new values and resulting behaviour relating to individuals, that may be anticipated over the next two decades, would include the following.

- **The Lowering of Expectations**

Ontarians would learn to lower their expectations about the future. The absence of upward mobility, the justification of class, and the belief that "less is more" could all become accepted. In many respects, this could lead to behaviour patterns not dissimilar to those associated with the conserver society: a more sedentary existence, extended families, energy conservation, lowering of wage demands, and so on. At the same time, however, the traditional value placed on progress might be replaced with a new value on survival, as the competition for scarce resources heats up (as it would, considering there would be a growing acceptance that resources, in fact, are scarce).




Figure 3/ Low-Growth Scenario

- **The New Frugality**

Therefore, while there might be a society that places far less value on consumption, there may also be a society that places far more value on saving. The most negative tendency of this realignment of values could conceivably be a society that has a tendency to hoard and sees less percentage in sharing and honesty. The increased growth of an underground economy, community and even household parochialism, and increased social aggression, therefore, might also accompany this new value.

- **The New Practicality**

As Ontarians strive to save, and compete for, scarce resources, a growing disdain for non-practical pursuits could develop. Part of the new evolving value system, therefore, might be practicality. If "it" didn't produce goods in the stagnant economy, then "it" would not be valued. The first institution affected could be the educational system, where (conceivably) liberal arts and even some professional disciplines would fall into disfavour. Similarly, a preoccupation with the arts and culture would likely diminish.

- **Social Immobility and Social Intolerance**

The combination of the lowering of expectations, the new frugality and the new practicality would understandably lead to widely-divergent lifestyles. Individuals would be restricted (and would accept that restriction) in the lifestyle pursuits they could attain and, therefore, would personally find value in almost any social pattern in which they might find themselves. At the same time, however, because some of these lifestyles might conceivably threaten these new value structures, a disdain for nonconformity could also develop. The most obvious outgrowth of this tendency would be the development of class consciousness in this province and the intended social discord that that consciousness brings.

4.2/ The Institutionalization of the Desire for Control

Social values and behaviour relating to the individual (discussed above) would obviously have a collective impact on values and behaviour relating to society as a whole. In tandem with the breakdown of status substitution then, the institutionalization of the desire for control might be expected.

As with individual aspirations under old rules, the gap between "the world as it is" and "the world as it should be" might also be expected to narrow. In a societal context, however, the very tendency that produced a desire for control -- the premium placed on stability and solutions -- might become institutionalized during slow economic growth and traditional re-industrialization. In other words, where once the desire for control flowed from a desire to bring "the world as it is" into closer accord with "the world as it should be," over the next two decades the desire for control may become central to the value-structuring process, as individuals seek to maintain their new status in at least an equilibrium, and not let it sink any further.

Should the desire for control become institutionalized, therefore, Ontario culture would be characterized by an overriding preoccupation with "ends": means would become increasingly less important, as long as results -- again, stability -- were offered, and the prevailing question of "does it work?" would become the sole criterion for evaluating social phenomena.

However, because under this scenario Ontario society would have accepted a failure of the system -- that is, accompanying the recognition that problems faced are real would be a growing acknowledgement that traditionally-perceived problem solvers are no longer adequate to meet the demand for control -- it might also be expected that individuals would lose faith in old authority figures and systems and seek new ones.

Some of the extended values and behaviours witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s, that might accelerate and become dominant in Ontario culture, therefore, would include the following.

- **The New Authoritarianism**

While it may sound like it borders on the hysterical, the logical extension of the desire for control is the evolution of a new authoritarianism. As individuals seek to minimize the value losses they have been experiencing, they will look to new authority figures to protect their vested interest. As vested interest diminishes and becomes accepted at that diminished level, the tendency will be to give

up more individual freedoms to maintain a social equilibrium which protects that which is left. Deference to strong leadership, be it religious, political or social, therefore, will be sought and supported.

- **The Fight for Jobs**

One of the obvious solutions leaders will be called upon to provide is the provision of jobs. Because low growth will not be able to accommodate the entry of the so-called "Big Generation" through the 1980s, and because the new frugality and lowering of expectations will lead to the retention of less desirable jobs, the fight for jobs may predominate the political agenda.

- **The Primacy of Social Issues**

Notwithstanding the demands on the system to provide and secure jobs, it is quite conceivable that the total political agenda may shift from economic to social issues. As the fight for jobs accelerates, and as the stagnant economy becomes accepted as "normal," those most alien to the host culture will be sought out as scapegoats. Equally, the disdain for nonconformity, and the proliferation of lifestyles, together with the institutionalization of the desire for control, will catapult immigration, law and order and welfare issues to the forefront. Again, it will be the state that will be called upon to arbitrate these social issues, and the assessment of how well they are minimizing this conflict will be based on the new authoritarianism.

- **The Beginning of Class-Based Politics**

Also, logically flowing out of these developments would be the beginning of class-based politics in Canada, similar to that experienced in the U.K. in the '60s and '70s. Slow economic growth and traditional re-industrialization will understandably diminish Ontario's heartland status, and as it does, "region" as the primary variable of Canadian political dialogue will also diminish. When this occurs, and as class consciousness becomes more ingrained, ideology will become more important and a right/left split more apparent. Under this scenario, one of the omnibus parties would probably disappear, and Ontario politics would be characterized by a two-party system based much more on class than it is now.

● Introspection and Economic Nationalism

On the global front, the desire for control would likely be extended to international affairs. Given Canadians' and Ontarians' view of themselves and their country, an increasingly competitive world market where Canada and Ontario were less able to compete would lead to retrenchment and isolation. Again, flowing out of this desire for control, and as a defence mechanism against international uncertainties, accelerated introspection and economic nationalism might develop. Demands for nationalization or the purging of multinationals from Canada, as well as looser ties with the U.S., might be expected under this scenario, as Ontarians seek to insulate themselves from "foreign" sources and seek scapegoats for their diminished expectations.

Quite obviously, these values and behavioural changes would not effect all sub-groups of the Ontario population in the same way. Basically, the widest divergence of values would likely develop on the basis of age and income.

The (currently) youngest generation, more than any other, has been socialized to believe that growth is "normal." These individuals, however, also show the greatest propensity to seek substitute status, while adhering to traditional values. The so-called "Big Generation," therefore, would be most resistant to accepting the new values relating to the individual (i.e., breakdown of status substitution), and the most prone to embrace the new values relating to society (i.e., the institutionalization of the desire for control).

Given that the new youth generation (currently between the ages of 0 and 15), by the year 2000, will be socialized during this period of value transition, it might be expected that these individuals could behave and hold values in stark contrast to their elders. The nature of this contrast, however, is virtually impossible to predict as little is known about the current value systems of these people and how their socializers might impart changing values to them.

Income, of course, would be important inasmuch as it would dictate the individual's ability to withstand the continuing "aberration" of low growth and "no change." At the same time, however, income will increasingly define the individual and divide Ontario society. It might be expected, therefore, that high income earners would be the slowest to embrace the new societal values, but once accepted socially, they would become most vociferous in defending and justifying income difference.

Also, while these would be the two dominant dimensions upon which value differences might be noted, the scenario also suggests that variables such as ethnicity, marital status, sexual preference, etc., could conceivably play a more predominant role in social conflict than they have, to date. In other words, as the primacy of social issues becomes more pronounced, the presence and behaviour of various "minority" groups will become more socially controversial.

In composite, this scenario depicts a considerable alteration in social values and behaviour at both the individual and societal level. However, if it is accepted that social values and behaviour are now in conflict and on a precipice, it can be seen how these tendencies might develop. Moreover, the analysis of current social values and behaviour also reveals that the seeds of these "new" values and behaviour are already apparent in Ontario culture. But because social values tend to be organic, this massive alteration will likely occur over a long period of time, or if dramatic events were to accelerate their pace.

The type of dramatic events that might "trigger" these changes would probably all share the same characteristics: the events would have to demonstrate, very dramatically, that all readily-perceived problems are not alterations, but, in fact, are real and will likely occur again, or endure over time. These "seed events," therefore, would force individuals to close their perceptual gap between "aspirations attained" and "aspirations sought," and "the world as it is" and "the world as it should be," and in doing so, realign traditionally-held values consistent with the new reality.

This realignment, in turn, would produce behaviours more consistent with those new values cited above.

Types of events that might produce this realignment would include the following.

- **Deflation** or negative price growth would most certainly cause the collapse of under-capitalized industry in Canada. The death of old industries, the loss of jobs, and the collapse of the stock market would all signal continuation and exacerbation of current problems.
- **An extended energy crisis** that would curtail individual mobility and threaten the sanctity of the single-family home could very well produce this realignment.
- **Massive unemployment** (a wholesale loss of jobs), where the employed individuals were forced to drastically reduce wage demands in exchange for job security, and the unemployed were forced to seek remuneration outside the normal work environment is another plausible "seed event."
- **A complete paralysis of the party structure and parliamentary government**, or the demonstration, over an extended period of time, that traditional authority systems were unable to operate would also qualify as a "seed event" under this scenario.

5/ HIGH-GROWTH SCENARIO

If Ontario was to experience rapid growth and the adoption of new technologies, there is no question that the techno-structure would undergo massive change. At the same time, and because of the current conflict between value systems, and between beliefs and behaviour, the most likely change to social values and behaviour would be no change -- no change, not in terms of the maintenance of the status quo, but, rather, in terms of the major value structures and behaviours that have existed for approximately 25 of the last 35 years (i.e., 1948 to 1973).

For, if Ontario was to experience rapid growth and the adoption of new technologies, Ontarians would be experiencing "progress" (if not stability). And as a desired "end-state," the realization of "progress" would reduce the value/behaviour conflict Ontarians are now experiencing, but in a manner that would simply reinforce traditional values, rather than produce new ones. What might be anticipated under this scenario, therefore, is a "high-tech, return to the '50s," where traditional values (now being cross-pressured by the [aberrant] "new reality") would resurface, and social behaviour would once again flow logically from those more consistently-held beliefs. (Therefore, this is a situation of change producing no change in values and behaviour.) (See Figure 4.)

5.1/ The Trauma of Transition

This is not to say that this scenario would produce a perfect world for Ontario. Rather, these changes would simply produce a perceived condition that is eminently more consistent with existing value structures, than either the current condition, or one associated with long-term, slow economic growth and traditional re-industrialization.

Even though this scenario would lead to value consistency with the least social and behaviour dislocations, the very fact that this scenario assumes change will traumatize the Ontario population.

As was noted earlier, Ontarians welcome change that produces stability and resist change that threatens stability. Technological change, as it is currently understood, threatens stability, and as such, it is rejected.




Figure 4/ High-Growth Scenario

For this scenario to minimize value and behaviour conflicts, therefore, it must be accompanied by other changes (such as, extensive manpower training, the reorientation of the education system, and so on) that will allow Ontarians "to cope" with the trauma of transition.

Otherwise, this scenario may be met with (if not a new Luddite movement, certainly) a growing polarization of the population, where some are prepared to participate in this change in order to minimize the discomfort of their value inconsistency, and others will refuse to participate and will minimize the discomfort of their value inconsistency through continued status substitution and the desire for control. Moreover, those who are most likely to refuse to participate in these changes will be those who find this change most threatening (i.e., the older segments of the population), and those for whom status substitution has become most ingrained as part of their value structure (i.e., the younger segments of the population).

Assuming, however, that accommodations are made to allow Ontarians to cope during this transition period, the major changes (or re-emergence) of social values and behaviour can be termed "new status without substitution" and "the new individualism."

5.2/ Status Without Substitution

Following World War II, and with the advent of new-found prosperity, Ontarians began to embrace new definitions of status, based on material accumulation and social standing. In no small way, the definition of status in this manner was conditioned by the hangover of the post-industrial era and the Depression. These measures of status, however, were driven by a value placed on progress and stability, which continues to this day. It is likely then that in the future, having been conditioned by the "new reality" of the mid '70s and early '80s, Ontarians would, once again, seek new definitions of status, consistent with both the value placed on progress and stability and on the economic conditions of renewed rapid growth and technological change. In short, while "values" would not necessarily shift under this scenario, new behaviour consistent with the infusion of new technology might be anticipated. Moreover, it might also be expected that these new definitions of status

will not be substitute forms for a more desired end, but rather the direct outgrowth of a new definition of progress.

- **The New Definition of Progress**

Under a high-growth scenario, the re-emergence of old values, among them, the premium placed on progress, could be expected. However, the new reality of advanced technology and the trauma of transition could very well lead to a new definition of progress. Rather than progress being measured in terms of material acquisition and social status, it may be based on how much the individual contributed and guided this rapid growth, and how well the individual was able to cope, and help others to cope, with the trauma of transition.

- **Specialists and Generalists**

If this new definition of progress evolves, and if Ontario is experiencing rapid technological change, then society would require both generalists and specialists to harness this change. Similarly, this requirement could be accompanied by a new value placed on both specialization and generalization, where one's status was not dictated so much on the role occupied in society, but rather on the function. Scientists, therefore, might conceivably have higher status than bankers; planners might have greater status than doctors; technical programmers might have greater status than scientists, and so on. Equally, as the premium of specialization and generalization becomes ingrained, there might be a rebirth of the sponsorship of the arts, where productive specialists directly supported or sponsored the non-technical works of artists and performers.

- **Conformity in Nonconformity**

An increasing set of different lifestyles might accompany the institutionalization of specialists and generalists in society. Unlike values and behaviour under low-growth, however, the new definition of progress may produce a genuine toleration of nonconformity not experienced before. This value set then would lead to a lifestyle setting where "do your own thing" would really mean something and become an accepted way of life.

- **The Leisure Society**

A shift to new technologies, rapid economic growth and divergent life-styles will also lead to an increased premium being placed on leisure. As part of the new definition of progress, therefore, the value placed on quality of life might not simply substitute for standard of living, but actually replace the value placed on standard of living. More time being spent with the family, recreational time-sharing and other leisure pursuits would all follow as an outgrowth of this value system.

5.3/ Resurgent Individualism

What new status without substitution inevitably will lead to is the evolution of renewed individualism. Whereas the desire for control flows out of low personal efficacy and high systemic efficacy, this individualism would flow out of increased personal efficacy, as individual and societal problems were seen to become more manageable. The reduced uncertainties accompanying this growth, therefore, would weaken the (perceived) role of social and political institutions as necessary providers of stability. Rather than there being a society that turned to institutions for control, individuals themselves would become more self-reliant. Altered behavioural patterns, in turn, would follow directly from the renewed value placed on the individual.

- **The New Rationalism**

With the increased priority on individualism will follow a new belief in rationalism, the solvability of problems and the unlimited perfectibility of man and society. Because solutions to readily-perceived problems will be forthcoming as a consequence of rapid economic growth (i.e., "progress"), this condition will reinforce the nascent sense of optimism about the future. This, in turn, will lead to an increased priority on solution-seeking, by individuals, with the ultimate criterion for problem solving being rationalism.

- **The Rebirth of the Entrepreneurial Individual**

Should the new individualism come about, its economic outgrowth would be a rebirth of the entrepreneurial individual. The primacy unit of economic production then would become the individual, rather than the corporation, as single individuals or families produced and sold goods to other individuals or networks of individuals.

- **Decentralization**

As a greater priority is placed on the individual, and as the economic system becomes more "atomistic," centralized control will become less important and less valued. The structures of our political, economic and social systems, therefore, might be expected to become more decentralized as a result of these renewed priorities

- **The Global Outlook**

Even though our systems may become more decentralized, and a greater premium may be placed on decentralization, Ontarians could conceivably begin to become far more sensitive to the global community and world events. Because Ontarians would not be forced to retrench to defend their failing competitive position, their "natural" view of themselves as "leaders" in Canada and the world might come to the fore. This would lead to a renewed interest in non-Ontario events and an increasing desire to play a role in larger world context.

As with social values and behaviours under low-growth, none of these developments could be expected to emerge without a "trigger" that would cause these traditional values to re-emerge. Again, "seed" events that would produce this re-emergence would all share the same characteristics -- they would visibly, and dramatically, demonstrate that changes are required if traditional values are to be realized, and that this change itself will produce the realization of these deeply-held traditional values. These events might include:

- industrial realignment followed by significant real growth,
- education extending beyond school years into the workplace (i.e., societal-wide acceptance of professional development and manpower training as part of the educational system),
- North American continentalism,
- a startling scientific breakthrough, and
- space travel

6/ CONCLUSION

A review of the above developments will undoubtedly lead the reader to his or her own value assumptions about the writer's postulations, namely, that the high-growth scenario will produce social values and behaviours that are far more preferable to those that might be experienced under low growth. This prejudice, in fact, is acknowledged. But the conclusion that one arrives at in reading these scenarios is one that the writer arrived at following his analysis of current social values and behaviour, and not in advance of projecting social values and behaviour into the future.

In the crudest of terms, it can be concluded that Ontarians do not "like" their current situation: they "want" to believe that today is as bad as it ever has been, and is as bad as it will ever get. At the same time, they tend to be optimistic about the future and cling to their traditional values in the hope that these values will be realizable when "things get better." Yet, there is also a growing uncertainty and anxiety about the values they hold, the divergent beliefs they are beginning to form, and the behaviours they are performing.

This situation suggests that change, in one form or another, will occur. The low-growth situation is, in fact, causing the increasing value inconsistency and discomfort Ontarians are experiencing, and therefore, if this persists, Ontarians will minimize their discomfort by changing their values. On the other hand, if the high-growth situation suggests to Ontarians that traditional values are attainable, then value consistency will re-emerge, and Ontario and Canada will continue to be characterized as "The Peaceable Kingdom."

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